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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-NATIONALITY ACT OF 1940--Loss OF
CITIZENSHIP UPON CONVICTION OF WARTIME DESERTION.
Trop v. Dulles (U.S. 1958)
During World War II, petitioner, a private in the United States
Army, escaped from a stockade in French Morocco where he was being
held for a breach of discipline. After being gone for a day, he decided to
return to the stockade and was subsequently turned over to the military
police. Upon conviction of desertion' by a general court-marital, petitioner
was sentenced, inter alia, to a dishonorable discharge. In 1952, petitioner
applied for a passport and his application was refused on the ground that
he had lost his citizenship under section 401(g) of the Nationality Act of
1940 which provides for loss of citizenship upon conviction of wartime
desertion and subsequent dishonorable discharge. 2 Petitioner, a native
born American citizen, then brought this action in the United States dis-
trict court for a judgment declaring him to be a citizen of the United
States. The action was summarily dismissed, and petitioner appealed to
the court of appeals which held that under the Nationality Act of 1940,
expatriation would follow upon a dishonorable discharge for conviction
of wartime desertion. The Supreme Court reversed holding section 401 (g)
of the Nationality Act of 1940 to be unconstitutional as beyond the war
power of Congress, and, therefore, that the imposition of expatriation for
wartime desertion was cruel and unusual punishment. Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958).3
At common law, the doctrine of perpetual allegiance prevailed and
one could not change his allegiance without the consent of the sovereign. 4
Congress, however, passed an act acknowledging expatriation to be a
natural and inherent right of all people, exercisable without the consent
of the sovereign. 5 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that a mere
1. "Any member of the armed forces who - (1) without authority goes or remains
absent from his unit, organization or place of duty with intent to remain away there-
from permanently, . . . is guilty of desertion." 64 STAT. 135 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 679
(1952).
2. 54 STAT. 1169 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (8) (1952).
3. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
4. Inglis v. Sailors Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830) ; Shanks v. Dupont,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242 (1830).
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voluntary performance of the expatriating act itself, and not an expressed
renunciation of citizenship, is all that is necessary to result in expatriation ;6
it is not a requisite that one intend to lose his citizenship.7 Loss of the
rights of citizenship, has been upheld as a valid penalty for desertion and
draft avoidance,8 but previous to the decision in the instant case, loss of
citizenship, i.e., expatriation, has never been declared a penalty. A penalty
has been defined as an exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an
unlawful act. 9 An exercise of one of the enumerated powers of the con-
stitution, however, will not be considered a penalty where there is a rea-
sonable relation between the action taken and the power exercised. 10 In
all cases, cruelty inherent in the method of punishment is prohibited as
being cruel and unusual punishment." Recently, expatriation for voting
in a foreign election was held to be constitutionally imposed as a necessary
and proper means in the execution of the foreign affairs power.12 The
Court reasoned that the imposition of expatriation prevents embarrassment
of the United States in international relations, resulting from Americans
voting in foreign elections and having their views interpreted as those of
the government, by disassociating those individuals from the United States.
In the instant case, -the Court held that expatriation was not a means
necessary and proper to the execution of the war powers because there
was no rational connection between involuntary expatriation and the legiti-
mate exercise of the war powers. It held that expatriation was a cruel
and unusual punishment for desertion because it created statelessness.'8
In the instant case, it would appear that expatriation for wartime
desertion bears little relation to the exercise of the war powers by Con-
gress, in that it is related to the waging of war only by virtue of its being
a punishment for a military offense. Further, the imposition of expatriation
here has slight relation to the exercise of what the Court referred to as the
foreign affairs power 14 since, by taking citizenship away for desertion,
Congress is in no way regulating the foreign affairs of the nation. Simi-
larly, expatriation for treason, violation of the Smith Act and draft avoid-
ance, seem to be on doubtful constitutional grounds, as being more in the
nature of punishment for the offenses committed. However, service in a
foreign army, employment by a foreign government, or, as in Perez v.
6. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
7. Acheson v. Wohlmuth, 196 F.2d 866 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
8. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885).
9. United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931).
10. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950).
11. Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
12. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
13. For the effect of statelessness see Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206, where an alien who lived in this country for twenty-five years went to
Europe to see his dying mother. Upon returning to this country in 1950, after an
absence of almost two years he was refused entrance and detained on Ellis Island.
Since he was refused entry by all other countries he could not be deported. After three
years the Court denied relief and he was doomed to a life on Ellis Island. He was re-
leased some months thereafter, only after a Presidential decree.
14. U.S. CoNsT. Art. VI, cl. 2.
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Brownell,15 voting in a foreign election, are acts which by their nature tend
to cause friction in international relations, and Congress may therefore
impose expatriation as a necessary and proper means for the prevention
of such friction. This exercise of the power to regulate foreign affairs,
though not unconstitutional, is nevertheless harsh, particularly when the
expatriate has acted in the best interest of his country. It seems incon-
gruous that, under the power to regulate foreign affairs, the United States
should expatriate an individual who might have voted in a foreign election
for policies friendly to this country, fought in a foreign army against a
power soon to attack the United States, or been employed by an ally of
the United States, and yet forbid the imposition of expatriation in cases
of treason, draft evasion, sedition, or wartime desertion, as being cruel
and unusual punishment. This country could just as easily show its dis-
satisfaction with the expatriating act by the imposition of some legally
accepted penalty. Expatriation could be added in the case of dual nationals
committing the expatriating act in the jurisdiction of their other nation-
ality,16 because by such act, they would be evidencing an intent to choose
some other citizenship than that of the United States. Expatriation in
this instance would be a necessary and proper means for preventing the
international complications attendant upon the status of dual nationality."
John G. Hall
EQUITY-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION-JURISDICTION OF EQUITY
WHERE TITLE Is IN DISPUTE.
Williams v. Bridy (Pa. 1957)
Plaintiff, the alleged lessee of a culm bank,' secured a preliminary
injunction restraining defendants from removing the culm. Defendant
disputed plaintiff's right to the injunction on the ground that title to the
culm was in a third party, the grantee of the original owner of the tract
15. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
16. This would include one who acquired dual nationality by the commission of
the expatriating act but not a dual national who acts in a third jurisdiction and does
not acquire that nationality, e.g., A, a jus sanguinis citizen of the United States and
a jus soli citizen of Great Britain, votes in a foreign election in Brazil but does not
acquire that nationality. He should not be subject to expatriation since if Great
Britain had a similar statute he would become a stateless being.
17. Some of the difficulties which might arise as a result of dual nationality are:
whether the United States is under an obligation to press for the release of a dual
national from a foreign army after his term of enlistment is up; whether it is under
a duty to insist on the right of a dual national to leave a foreign country upon termi-
nation of a job in that country's government which entailed handling security informa-
tion; or, if it should press for the release of a dual national who was arrested for
voting in a foreign election because he was a citizen of another country (i.e., the
United States).
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and the culm.2 There being no issues of fact,3 only the construction of
the deeds remained to be determined before a final decree would issue.
The supreme court, however, reversed the decree granting the preliminary
injunction and certified the case to the law side of the court, holding that
since legal title was still in dispute the equity side of the court had no
jurisdiction. Williams v. Bridy, 391 Pa. 1, 136 A.2d 832 (1957). 4
The granting of a temporary or preliminary injunction is within the
discretion of the trial court 5 and on appeal the court will look to see if
there are any reasonable grounds for the action of the lower court or if
the rules applied are clearly inapplicable. 6 Where it is necessary to restrain
irreparable injury7 a temporary injunction may be granted until there
is a final determination on the merits.8 However, this discretionary power
of the court is specifically modified in most jurisdictions,9 including Pennsyl-
vania,10 by the requirement that the right upon which plaintiff bases his
claim be clear and without doubt. In Hueneme, M. & P.L.A. Ry. v.
Fletcher" therefore, a preliminary injunction was properly denied because
plaintiff's right, as evidenced by his title to land, was disputed by evidence
of a public easement. 12 Some jurisdictions, however, have granted pre-
liminary injunctions where plaintiff's right is no more than probable. 13
Such courts usually look to the circumstances and equities involved in
the particular case. 14 However, even where a clear and doubtless right is
2. Culm and coal severed from the realty are personal property and do not pass
with title to realty, and therefore would not have passed to defendant with the title to
the tract. Llewellyn v. Philadelphia & R. C. & I. Co., 308 Pa. 497, 162 Atl. 429 (1932) ;
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 294 Pa. 47, 143 Atl. 474
(1928).
3. Brief for Appellants, p. 16, Williams v. Bridy, 391 Pa. 1, 136 A.2d 832 (1957)
Brief for Appellees, p. 2, ibid.
4. Williams v. Bridy, 391 Pa. 1, 136 A.2d 832 (1957).
5. Passaic-Athenia Bus Co. v. Consolidated Bus Lines, 100 N.J. Eq. 185, 135 Ati.
284 (Ch. 1926) ; Freseman v. Purvis, 51 Pa. Super. 506 (1912).
6. Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 385 Pa. 342, 123 A.2d 626 (1956).
7. N.Y. State Natural Gas Corp. v. Roeder, 384 Pa. 198, 120 A.2d 170 (1956)
Walters v. McElroy, 151 Pa. 549, 25 Atl. 125 (1897) ; Commonwealth v. The Pitts-
burgh & Connellsville R.R., 24 Pa. 159 (1854) ; Commonwealth v. Rush, 14 Pa. 186
(1849).
8. Gamlen Chemical Co. v. Gamlen, 79 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa. 1948); May v.
Light, 5 Leb. L.J. 175 (C.P., Pa. 1953) ; Gerner v. Kespelher, 26 West. L.J. 114 (C.P.,
Pa. 1944). See Fredericks v. Huber, 180 Pa. 572, 37 Atl. 90 (1897).
9. See, e.g., Hueneme, M. & P.L.A. Ry. v. Fletcher, 65 Cal. App. 698, 224 Pac.
774 (1924) ; Tarver v. Silver, 180 Ga. 124, 178 S.E. 377 (1935) ; Braverman v. First
Merchants Nat. Bank of Lafayette, 211 Ind. 344, 7 N.E.2d 198 (1937) ; Budenkopf v.
Des Moines Life Ins. Co., 160 Iowa 629, 142 N.W. 434 (1913) ; Hamilton v. United
Laundries Corp., 111 N.J. Eq. 78, 161 AtI. 347 (Ch. 1932).
10. See, e.g., Diamond Full Fashioned Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 20 F. Supp. 467
(E.D. Pa. 1937) ; Herr v. Rumisek, 303 Pa. 9, 153 At1. 728 (1931).
11. 65'Cal. App. 698, 224 Pac. 774 (1924).
12. See also Herr v. Rumisek, 303 Pa. 9, 153 Atl. 728 (1931), where plaintiff's
right as a taxpayer to enjoin expenditure by school authorities was in doubt because
of question as to whether expenditure would be over the limit prescribed by law.
13. See, e.g., Sinclair Refining Co. v. Midland Oil Co., 55 F.2d 42 (4th Cir. 1932)(injunction granted to maintain the status quo between the parties until final determi-
nation of plaintiff's rights could be made) ; Wilentz v. Hendrickson, 133 N.J. Eq. 447,
33 A.2d 366 (Ch. 1943) (doubt of validity of plaintiff's cause of action found no bar
to issuance of temporary injunction).
14. Ibid.
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1958], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol4/iss1/5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
required, if the basis of the right is title to real property, as in a case of
continuing trespass, it may or may not be necessary that plaintiff establish
his title in an action at law." The court in Miller v. Lynch1" would not
reverse the granting of a preliminary injunction on the ground that title
had not been established at law, reasoning that defendant had not pre-
sented a serious dispute in regard to plaintiff's title.
The court in the instant case found, in effect, that defendant had pre-
sented a serious dispute to plaintiff's title by introducing deeds which re-
quired construction. While in accord with previous Pennsylvania de-
cisions, 7 an analysis of the rule employed by the court might suggest
that a different result should have been reached. The court cites with
approval a recent expression of the requisite title for equity to grant a
preliminary injunction which expression required such clearness that a
judge in a trial at law would not be at liberty, upon the same evidence, to
submit the question of plaintiff's title to a jury.'8 The reason for the rule
is that when reasonable men might differ the parties are entitled to have
disputed facts decided by a jury.19 This would also appear to be the reason
for the adoption by some courts of the further requirement that no facts
be in issue.20 Where then, there are no disputed facts, as in the instant
case, and only the determination of the legal effect to be given the deeds
remains, a judge sitting on the equity side of the court can, with as much
facility, construe the deeds as he could sitting on the law side,21 there be-
ing no right to a jury trial involved. Plaintiff here, if he can establish his
title at a final hearing, has presented a case of continuing trespass which
appears to merit immediate equitable relief, for while he would be pur-
suing a remedy at law, defendant could continue to deplete the culm bank.
Where the full determination of the rights of the parties can be had in one
equity proceeding, it seems unnecessary to force the plaintiff to seek his
remedy first at law, when he must subsequently petition equity in order
15. Miller v. Lynch, 147 Pa. 460,24 Atl. 80 (1892).
16. 147 Pa. 460, 24 Atl. 80 (1892).
17. See, e.g., North Shore R.R. v. Pennsylvania Co., 193 Pa. 641, 44 Atl. 1083
(1899); Delaware, L. & W.R. Co. v. Newton Coal Mining Co., 137 Pa. 314, 21 Atl.
171 (1890) ; Appeal of Washburn, 105 Pa. 480 (1884) ; The Mammoth Vein Consol.
Coal Co.'s Appeal, 54 Pa. 183 (1867); LeFrance v. The Lackawanna & Wyoming
Valley R.R., 5 Lack. Jur. 129 (C.P., Pa. 1904).
18. Hunter v. McKlveen, 353 Pa. 357, 45 A.2d 222 (1946).
19. Teacher v. Kijurina, 365 Pa. 480, 76 A.2d 197 (1950) ; Pennsylvania Coal &
Coke Co. v. Jones, 30 Pa. Super. 358 (1906) ; Washburn's Appeal, 105 Pa. 480, 484(1884) (dictum).
20. Piro v. Shipley, 211 Pa. 36, 60 At. 325 (1905) ; Miller v. Lynch, 147 Pa. 460,
24 Atl. 80 (1892) ; Englehart v. Westmoreland Water Co., 165 Pa. Super. 156, 67 A.2d
775 (1949).
21. Thomas v. Morgan, 6 Lack. Jur. 290-91 (C.P., Pa. 1905) (dictum). See also
United States v. Sandlass, 34 F. Supp. 81 (D.N.J. 1940) ; Teacher v. Kijurina, 365
Pa. 480, 76 A.2d 197 (1950), where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in reviewing
the denial of an injunction held that the lower court erred in deciding that a deed in
question set up a joint tenancy, for they ruled on conflicting oral testimony and
equity does not have jurisdiction where facts are in dispute. The court, after declaring
the oral testimony inadmissible, as to the construction to be given the deed, ruled
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to obtain adequate relief. Where there are no issues of fact, the require-
ment that plaintiff must prove clear and doubtless title thwarts the purpose
of the preliminary injunction and greatly limits the discretionary powers
of the trial court,2 2 which should be free to weigh the need of protection
for the plaintiff against the probable injury to the defendant when the
court is satisfied there is a probable right.23
Joseph J. Mahon, Jr.
EVIDENCE-ARGUMENTATION OF COUNSEL-USE OF MATHEMATICAL
FORMULA FOR THE ADMEASUREMENT OF DAMAGES
FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING.
Botta v. Brunner (N.J. 1958)
Plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile driven by the defendant
and was injured when it collided with another car. During the trial, plain-
tiff's attorney suggested to the jury in his closing argument a mathematical
formula of fifty cents an hour to aid them in measuring the damages for
pain and suffering. The jury returned a verdict of $5,500. From a denial
of a motion for new trial on the grounds that, inter alia, the award was
inadequate, plaintiff appealed. The superior court found that the trial
court had erred in its charge to the jury on the burden of proof which
the plaintiff was required to satisfy in establishing her injuries,' and fur-
ther, that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury to disregard
plaintiff's suggestion of a mathematical formula for the admeasurement
of damages for pain and suffering, and granted a new trial limited to
the issue of damages,2 The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the
superior court's finding of error as to the improper instructions on the
22. See Note, Temporary Injunction in Cases Involving Doubtful Questions of
Law, 40 MARQ. L. REv. 191 (1956).
23. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Midland Oil Co., 55 F.2d 42, 45 (4th Cir., 1932),
where the court cautions that "the granting of the temporary injunction does not
determine the rights of the parties . .. and the test on appeal is not whether the
appellate court would have granted or denied the injunction, but whether the record
shows an abuse of authority by the trial judge."
Notwithstanding the rule of equity that complainant must succeed on his own
title not on a weakness of legal right asserted by respondent, Myerdale & Salisbury
Street Ry. v. Pennsylvania & Md. Street Ry., 219 Pa. 558, 69 Atd. 92 (1907), the fact
that defendant here made no claim to a right in himself to the culm should be con-
sidered in determining whether or not harm will result from granting the injunction
until a final hearing can be made on the legal construction of the deeds.
1. The charge of the trial court was as follows: "I think I have already charged
you with regard to the responsibility of Mrs. Botta to prove by clear, convincing
evidence that her injuries were the result of the accident .. " The superior court
held that this was error since the burden cast on plaintiff is to prove that her injuries
resulted from the accident by a preponderance of the evidence and not that she must
do so by clear and convincing evidence. Botta v. Brunner, 42 N.J. Super. 95, 126
A.2d 32, 37 (1956).
2. Botta v. Brunner, 42 N.J. Super. 95, 126 A.2d 32 (1956).
FALL 1958]
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burden of proof, and accordingly affirmed the judgment. The court, how-
ever, modified the judgment of the superior court in holding, that it was
error for plaintiff's counsel, in opening or closing, to suggest to the jury
any mathematical formula to be used in calculating compensation for pain
and suffering. Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).3
Most jurisdictions acknowledge that the appreciation of pain and
suffering is a unique experience, 4 depending primarily on the nervous
sensibilities of the individual,5 and that no rule or mathematical standard
has been developed that can exactly correlate money damages with pain
and suffering.6 The only standard advanced has been that of reasonable
compensation. 7 While in agreement that the question of compensation for
pain and suffering rests ultimately with the jury," the courts are in con-
flict as to the right of counsel to comment on the amount of these damages.
When presenting his case, an attorney generally has a wide latitude of
reference," and may draw any reasonable inferences from the evidence.10
However, he cannot give independent testimony," or make of himself an
unsworn witness,1 2 nor express opinions or conclusions on matter not dis-
closed by the evidence.' 8 Reference by counsel to the ad damnum clause
or to damages in general has been approved by some jurisdictions,' 4 while
others have expressly condemned such practice. 1 However, few juris-
dictions have had the opportunity to offer an opinion on whether a mathe-
matical formula may be suggested to the jury. One state has expressly
approved the use of a formula;16 another has permitted such suggestions
3. Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
4. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Southern California Enterprises, 98 Cal. App. 240, 219
P.2d 928 (1950).
5. See, e.g., Littman v. Bell Telephone, 315 Pa. 370, 172 Atl. 687 (1934).
6. Coppinger v. Broderick, 37 Ariz. :473, 295 Pac. 780 (1931) ; Roedder v. Rowley,
28 Cal. 2d 820, 172 P.2d 353 (1946) ; Barvock v. Extract, 13 N.J. Super. 350, 80
A.2d 570 (1951) ; Robinson v. Lockridge, 230 App. Div. 389, 244 N.Y. Supp. 663 (4th
Dep't 1930); Wersebe v. Broadway & S.A.R. Co., I Misc. 472, 21 N.Y. Supp. 637
(Super. Ct. 1893) ; Baker v. Pennsylvania Co., 142 Pa. 503, 21 Atl. 979 (1891);
National Fruit Products Co. v. Wagner, 185 Va. 38, 37 S.E.2d 757 (1946) ; Parr v.
Douglas, 253 Wis. 311, 34 N.W.2d 229 (1948).
7. Roedder v. Rowley, supra note 6; Parr v. Douglas, supra note 6.
8. Hamlin v. N. H. Bragg & Sons, 129 Me. 165, 151 Atl. 197 (1931); Lee v.
McCormick, 279 Mich. 120, 271 N.W. 579 (1937) ; Robinson v. Lockridge, 230 App.
Div. 389, 244 N.Y. Supp. 663 (4th Dep't 1930).
9. Nusbuam v. Pennsylvania R.R., 340 Ill. App. 131, 90 N.E.2d 921 (1950).
10. Hayes v. Coleman, 338 Mich. 371, 61 N.W.2d 634 (1953).
11. Haffe v. Burd, 78 N.D. 278,49 N.W.2d 282 (1951).
12. Tampa Transit Lines v. Cordin, 62 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1952).
13. Haffe v. Burd, 78 N.D. 278, 49 N.W.2d 282 (1951).
14. Graham v. Matroon City R.R., 234 Ill. 483, 84 N.E. 1070 (1908) ; Aetna
Oil Co. v. Metcalf, 298 Ky. 706, 183 S.W.2d 637 (1944) ; Dean v. Wabash R.R., 229
Mo. 425, 129 S.W. 953 (1910); Williams v. Williams, 87 N.H. 430, 182 At. 172
(1935) ; Kimball v. Noel, 228 S.W.2d 980 (Tex. 1950).
15. Vaugh v. McGee, 218 Fed. 630 (3d Cir. 1914) ; Quinn v. Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Co., 224 Pa. 162, 73 At. 319 (1909).
16. Arnold v. Ellis, 97 So. 2d 744 (Miss. 1957) (counsel suggested a rate of
twenty cents an hour for the pain and suffering to be endured) ; Four-County Electric
Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954) (a chart which listed
pain and suffering at a rate of five dollars per day was used in the opening statement
by counsel). In both of these cases such practice by counsel was expressly limited to
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for illustrative purposes ;17 while a third has allowed reference by counsel
to the amount of damages claimed for pain and suffering.' 8 New Jersey, in
the instant case, is the first jurisdiction to expressly forbid the use of a
formula, although Pennsylvania has long condemned any reference to the
amount of damages for pain and suffering.19
The courts which allow counsel to suggest an amount of compensa-
tion for pain and suffering, assert that such practice is fair argumentation
based on inferences and deductions drawn from the evidence of plaintiff's
pain and suffering.20  Such courts feel that proper instructions by the
trial judge will protect the rights of all parties.21 An examination of the
verdicts where the practice has occurred will reveal that such protection
is, in many cases, lacking and that the exact figure suggested by plaintiff's
counsel has been accepted, producing excessive verdicts.22 The majority
in the instant case appears to appreciate the fact that such suggestions by
counsel, even under the guise of legitimate inference, has the same effect
as evidence, and that no admonition or instruction by the trial court can
entirely remove the figures suggested from the minds of the jury.23 The
admeasurement of damages in dollars and cents is, more properly, a matter
of opinion and speculation than of fact, which is in the complete discretion
of the jury, and no witness is ever permitted to estimate the amount of
damages sustained in a personal injury suit.24 There appears to be less
reason to allow counsel such privilege since there can be no opportunity
for cross-examination or to test the accuracy of these estimates. If counsel
is to be allowed the privilege of estimating the damages, such privilege
should be limited to elements which are at least susceptible to proof.
William B. Colsey, III
17. Boutang v. Twincity Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30 (1956). It
should be noted, however, that in this case the use of a mathematical formula as a
yardstick to test the reasonableness of the amount awarded was expressly condemned.
18. Kindler v. Edwards, 126 Ind. App. 261, 130 N.E.2d 491 (1955).
19. Joyce v. Smith, 269 Pa. 439, 112 Atl. 549 (1921) ; Baker v. Pennsylvania Co.,
142 Pa. 503, 21 Atl. 979 (1891).
20. Aetna v. Metcalf, 298 Ky. 706, 183 S.W.2d 637 (1944) ; Four-County Electric
Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954).
21. Four-County Electric Power Ass'n v. Clardy, supra note 20.
22. See Braddock v. Seaboard Airline R.R., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955) ; Bullock
v. Chester & Darby Telford Road Co., 270 Pa. 295, 113 Atl. 379 (1921) ; Reese v.
Hershey, 163 Pa. 253, 29 Atd. 907 (1894) (reference by the trial judge to the amount
of damages claimed by the plaintiff).
23. Hollinger v. York Rys., 225 Pa. 419, 74 Atl. 344 (1909).
24. Little Rock M.R. & T. Ry. v. Haynes, 47 Ark. 497, 1 S.W. 774 (1886)
Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. v. Tesee, 42 Okl. 188, 140 Pac. 1166 (1914) ; Bruton v. Sever-
ance, 22 Ore. 91, 29 Pac. 200 (1892).
FALL 1958]
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EVIDENCE-DEFENSE OF ALIBI-DEFENDANT HAS BURDEN OF
PROVING ALIBI TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE JURY.
Commonwealth v. Gates (Pa. 1958)
Harry Gates, on trial for murder, introduced evidence setting up the
defense of alibi. At the trial, the court, after stating that the burden was
upon the Commonwealth to prove the guilt of the prisoner beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and that this burden was not changed by the setting up of
an alibi as a defense, charged, "but where a person sets up an alibi as
a defense, the burden of proving his alibi to the satisfaction of the jury
is thrown upon him. If he does not do this his defense of alibi fails com-
pletely."' Upon conviction the defendant appealed urging that the court
erred, inter alia, in its charge as to alibi. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania affirmed, holding that the charge on alibi was proper and sufficient.
Commonwealth v. Gates, 392 Pa. 557, 141 A.2d 219 (1958). 2
An alibi is when one is present in a place other than where the crime
has been committed, and raises the inference that the accused could not
have committed the crime.' It is a denial of a material averment in the
indictment,4 and proof tending to support it, while not sufficient to estab-
lish the alibi as fact, may be sufficient, when considered in conjunction
with the other evidence, to raise that reasonable doubt which would acquit
the accused.5 The accused, therefore, does not have the ultimate burden
of proving the alibi ;6 the burden remains with the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.7 It has therefore been held to be
prejudicial error to charge that the defendant must establish his alibi by
clear and satisfactory evidence,8 by a preponderance of the evidence,9 or
to the jury's satisfaction,'0 since these statements tend to place the ultimate
burden of proof on the defendant, even though the jury be instructed that
the setting up of the defense of alibi does not change the prosecution's bur-
den of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." However, such an instruction
1. Commonwealth v. Gates, 392 Pa. 557, 563, 141 A.2d 219, 222 (1958).
2. Commonwealth v. Gates, 392 Pa. 557, 141 A.2d 219 (1958).
3. RtIMEL, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA 13 (1958).
4. Turner v. Commonwealth, 86 Pa. 54, 73 (1878).
5. Thomas v. United States, 213 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1954); Falgout v. United
States, 279 Fed. 513 (5th Cir. 1922) ; Commonwealth v. Choate, 105 Mass. 451 (1870) ;
People v. Barbato, 254 N.Y. 170, 172 N.E. 458 (1930) ; Commonwealth v. Mills, 350
Pa. 478, 39 A.2d 572 (1944).
6. 9 WIGMORn, EVIDENCE § 2512(c) (3d ed. 1940).
7. Thomas v. United States, 213 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1954) ; Falgout v. United States,
279 Fed. 513 (5th Cir. 1922) ; People v. Elmore, 277 N.Y. 397, 14 N.E.2d 451 (1938).
8. Cangelosi v. United States, 19 F.2d 923 (6th Cir. 1923).
9. Falgout v. United States, 279 Fed. 513 (5th Cir. 1922) ; Glover v. United States,
147 Fed. 426 (8th Cir. 1906) ; State v. Wines, 47 N.J. Super. 235, 135 A.2d 543 (1957) ;
Sherlock v. State, 60 N.J.L. 31, 37 Atl. 435 (Sup. Ct. 1897) ; State v. McGhee, 137
S.C. 256, 135 S.E. 59 (1926) (reversing previous approval of such a charge).
10. McDuffee v. State, 55 Fla. 125, 46 So. 721 (1908) ; Wafford v. State, 63 Ga.
304, 136 S.E. 49 (1926).
11. Cangelosi v. United States, 19 F.2d 923 (6th Cir. 1923) ; Falgout v. United
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which might tend to place the burden of proof on the defendant is cured
by a further charge to the effect that the evidence of alibi should also be
considered with all the evidence in determining if a reasonable doubt exists
as to defendant's guilt.12 In Pennsylvania it is required that specific in-
structions be given as to the nature, purpose, and the degree of persuasion
necessary to establish alibi. 13 Though it is well settled that the defendant
is entitled to an acquittal if he proves his alibi by a preponderance of the
evidence, 14 or as sometimes stated, to the satisfaction of the jury, 15 it is
equally clear that proof tending to establish the alibi, though not clear,
may with other facts of the case raise a reasonable doubt of the guilt of
the defendant and also work an acquittal.' 6 While in Commonwealth v.
Woong Knee New,'7 it was held that the jury must be instructed as to
this latter point, the court in Commonwealth v. Richardson stated that
such an instruction is not necessary, the point being adequately covered
by the general charge on reasonable doubt.'8 However, it is reversible
error if the charge tends to treat the evidence of alibi as being without
relevancy if the alibi is not proven by a preponderance of the evidence.' 9
Since Pennsylvania recognizes that the defendant is entitled to an
acquittal if the evidence of alibi is sufficient with the other facts in the
case to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, it cannot accurately be
said that the law imposes any burden of proof on the accused concerning
this issue.21 In light of this, it would seem that to allow the jury to be
charged that the burden is on the accused to prove his alibi to the satis-
12. Singh v. State, 35 Ariz. 432, 280 Pac. 672 (1929); McDuffee v. State, 55
Fla. 125, 46 So. 721 (1908) ; Wafford v. State, 63 Ga. 304, 136 S.E. 49 (1926) ; People
v. Robinson, 308 Ill. 398, 139 N.E. 599 (1923) ; People v. Stone, 117 N.Y. 480, 23
N.E. 13 (1889) ; State v. Brown, 102 Ohio App. 117, 141 N.E.2d 686 (1956) ; Rudy
v. Commonwealth, 128 Pa. 500, 18 Atl. 344 (1889); Fenner v. Commonwealth, 152
Va. 1014, 148 S.E. 821 (1929).
13. Commonwealth v. Stein, 305 Pa. 567, 158 Atl. 563 (1932) ; Commonwealth v.
Westley, 300 Pa. 16, 150 Atl. 94 (1930) ; Commonwealth v. Barrish, 279 Pa. 460, 146
Atl. 553 (1929). Contra Commonwealth v. De Palma, 268 Pa. 25, 110 Atl. 756 (1920).
14. Commonwealth v. Barrish, 297 Pa. 160, 146 Atl. 553 (1929) ; Rudy v. Com-
monwealth, 128 Pa. 500, 18 At. 344 (1889).
15. Commonwealth v. Gates, 392 Pa. 557, 141 A.2d 219 (1958).
16. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 392 Pa. 528, 140 A.2d 828 (1958); Woong
Knee New, 354 Pa. 188, 47 A.2d 450 (1946) ; Turner v. Commonwealth, 86 Pa. 54
(1878).
17. 354 Pa. 188, 47 A.2d 450 (1946). See also Commonwealth v. Barnak, 357
Pa. 391, 54 A.2d 865 (1947) ; Commonwealth v. Mills, 350 Pa. 478, 39 A.2d 572
(1944) ; Rudy v. Commonwealth, 128 Pa. 500, 18 At. 344 (1899).
18. 392 Pa. 528, 140 A.2d 828 (1958). See Commonwealth v. Gates, 392 Pa. 528,
141 A.2d 219 (1958) ; Commonwealth v. Blanchard, 345 Pa. 289, 26 A.2d 303 (1942).
See also Commonwealth v. Stein, 305 Pa. 567, 571, 158 Ati. 563, 564 (1932) where
the court states its fear that the charge on reasonable doubt might mislead the jury
into holding the alibi evidence to a higher standard of proof than is actually required
to acquit the accused. See also note 26 infra.
19. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 234 Pa. 547, 83 Atl. 412 (1912); Watson v.
Commonwealth, 95 Pa. 422 (1880).
20. See Commonwealth v. McQueen, 178 Pa. Super. 38, 42 n.1, 112 A.2d 820,
821 n.1 (1955) (The necessity of charging the jury that there is such a burden seems to
be a question that should be again reviewed by the supreme court.)
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faction of the jury is, at the very least, inconsistent and misleading. 21
While a charge virtually identical with the one approved in the instant
case was also approved in Commonwealth v. Rudy,22 the court there did
so only because it was immediately followed and modified by the same
instruction held necessary in the Woong Knee New case.23  Relying on
the Richardson case, a companion decision, the court in the instant case
appears to have ignored the absence of such a corrective instruction, al-
though the point was fully discussed in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Musmanno. 24 The Richardson case in turn cited Commonwealth
v. Blanchard, '2 in which case the court only gave this point cursory men-
tion, citing no authority nor presenting any reasoning to support its state-
ment. The decision in the instant case can only serve to afflict the accused
with the very real burden of proving his alibi to the satisfaction of the
jury since his defense, the jury is told, is valueless if he fails in his burden.2 6
The cure 27 which the court in the Rudy case found to be so effective in
correcting this particular error seemingly is no longer available; its demise
appears to have been initiated by the Richardson case and consumated by
the decision in the instant case.
Herbert H. Brown
EVIDENCE-WIRETAPPING-ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE IN STATE COURT.
Commonwealth v. Voci (Pa. 1958)
The defendant was convicted upon an indictment charging him with
pool selling and book making in violation of the Pennsylvania penal code.'
The only evidence supporting the verdict was the testimony of a city
detective who had, without authorization from the sender, listened in on
the telephone calls entering and leaving a cafe. Defendant contended that
this testimony was inadmissible because it constituted a divulgence of
21. See Cangelosi v. United States, 19 F.2d 923 (6th Cir. 1923) (charge is incon-
sistent and confusing); Commonwealth v. Barrish, 279 Pa. 460, 146 Atd. 553 (1929)
(a trifle incongruous) ; State v. McGhee, 137 S.C. 256, 135 S.E. 59 (1926) (such a
charge is illogical, inconsistent, and calculated to mislead the jury).
22. 128 Pa. 500, 18 Atl. 344 (1889).
23. "The jury must also be instructed that 'evidence in support of the alibi may,
with the other facts in the case, raise the reasonable doubt of guilt which entitles a
defendant to acquittal.'" Commonwealth v. Woong Knee New, 354 Pa. 188, 213, 47
A.2d 450, 464 (1946).
24. Commonwealth v. Gates, 392 Pa. 557, 569, 141 A.2d 219, 225 (dissenting
opinion).
25. 345 Pa. 289, 26 A.2d 303 (1942).
26. Of course "fails completely" does not really mean just that. More properly,
it means "that it failed as an independent defense, not that the evidence was insufficient
to raise a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Barrish, 297 Pa. 160, 171, 146 Atd.
553, 556 (1929). See note 18 supra.
27. See text at note 23 supra.
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information obtained by means of unauthorized interceptions of telephone
conversations in violation of Section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act.2 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in affirming the conviction
held that wiretap evidence, though secured in violation of a federal statute,
was admissible in Pennsylvania courts. Commonwealth v. Voci, 143 A.2d
652 (Pa. 1958). a
The United States Supreme Court has held that section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act prohibits the admission of evidence gained
by means of wiretapping in a federal court. 4 Section 605 has been further
construed as prohibiting the use of wiretap evidence in a state court when
such was procured by federal officials. 5 Intrastate messages, as well as
those interstate, have been found to be within the provisions of section
605.6 Since the jury is free to speculate that the act of wiretapping itself
is further evidence of the defendant's criminal activities, the Court, in
Benanti v. United States, 7 held that evidence procured by means of wire-
tapping is inadmissible in a federal court even if it were obtained by state
officials. The Court reasoned that:
"... [H] ad Congress intended to allow the States to make ex-
ceptions to Section 605, it would have said so. . . . [W] e find that
Congress, setting out a prohibition in plain terms, did not mean to
allow state legislation which would contradict that section and that
policy." 8
However, section 605 has not been found to prohibit the admission in a
state court of evidence obtained by state officials. 9 Prior to the instant
case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had approved the admission of
wiretap evidence procured by state officials. 10 The same question has
also been decided in the same manner by other states."
It should be noted that all the decisions concerning the admissibility
of wiretap evidence in state courts when such evidence was procured by
state officials were handed down prior to the decision in the Benanti case.
2. 48 STAT. 1103, 47 U.S.C. 605 (1934) which provides: ". . . [N]o person not
being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such inter-
cepted communication to any person ....
3. Commonwealth v. Voci, 143 A.2d 652 (Pa. 1958).
4. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), aff'd, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
5. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1955).
6. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939) ; United States v. Jenello, 102
F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1939) ; Sablowsky v. United States, 101 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1938) ;
United States v. Klee, 101 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1938) ; Diamond v. United States, 108
F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1938).
7. 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
8. Id. at 99.
9. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
10. Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 380 Pa. 532, 112 A.2d 379 (1955).
11. People v. Chanell, 107 Cal. App. 2d 192, 236 P.2d 654 (1951) ; Leon v. State,
180 Md. 279, 23 A.2d 706, sub. nom. Hubin v. State, 23 A.2d 706 (1942) ; People v.
Stemmer, 298 N.Y. 728, 83 N.E.2d 854 (1948) ; Harlem Check Cashing Corp. v. Bell,
296 N.Y. 15, 68 N.E.2d 854 (1946).
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The only judicial interpretation of the effect of the Benanti decision upon
this question is Matter of Interception of Tel. Comm.12 where the New
York court held that the act makes wiretapping illegal even though the
state officials have an order to do such pursuant to a New York statute
which permitted wiretapping. In fact, the federal government is presently
instituting criminal prosecutions in federal courts for wiretapping.13 It
would seem to be an anomaly, therefore, for the state courts to permit the
use of evidence which involves a possible federal crime in its procurement.
The Pennsylvania legislature has recognized this, and has passed a statute
prohibiting the introduction of evidence secured by a wiretap in any court
of the Commonwealth. This statute, however, was enacted subsequent to




FUTURE INTERESTS-RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES-APPLICATION
OF THE "WAIT AND SEE" RULE TO OPTIONS.
Mumma v. Hinkle (C.P. Pa. 1958)
The parties to this action were engaged as partners in a restaurant
and cabin business on land, the title to which was in the defendant. While
so engaged, they entered into an agreement in writing, acknowledged and
recorded, by which it was stipulated that the plaintiff, her heirs, executors,
administrators and assigns, should at all times in the future have an option
to purchase the land used in the business for a certain sum. The option
was exercised within six years, and, on refusal of the defendant to honor
it, plaintiff sought specific performance. The defendant filed preliminary
objections in the nature of a demurrer, contending that the option was
wholly void as in violation of the common law rule against perpetuities,
and that the amendments thereof embodied in the Estates Act of 1947,1
which adopted the "wait and see" rule, were inapplicable to any but family
settlement and gift transactions. The court rejected these contentions,
holding that the option was valid because it had actually been exercised
within the lives of the parties. Mumma v. Hinkle, 138 Legal Intelligencer
No. 47, p. 1, col. 1 (Pa. C.P. Dauph. March 10, 1958) .2
12. 9 Misc. 2d 121, 170 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
13. See, e.g., Massicot v. United States, 254 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1958).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2443 (Supp. 1957).
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4 (1947) : "(a) GENERAL. No interest shall be
void as a perpetuity except as herein provided. (b) VOID INT8RPST - ExCEPTIONS.
Upon the expiration of the period allowed by the common law rule against perpetuities
as measured by actual rather than possible events, any interest not then vested and any
interest in a class the membership of which is then subject to increase shall be void."
2. Mumma v. Hinkle, 138 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER No. 47, p. 1, col. 1 (Pa. C.P.
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Prior to the statutory revision of the rule against perpetuities in 1947,3
the common law rule had been applied in the case of options to purchase
land so as to hold void an option which might be exercised at any time.4
While the number of cases so holding is substantial,5 courts have not often
been called upon to determine the validity of an option which could be
exercised within the long periods possible under the rule, such as an option
to purchase land exercisable during the lives of any of the descendants
of Queen Victoria living at the time when the option was granted and
for twenty-one years thereafter.6 A few cases which have dealt with the
related problem of preemptive rights to purchase land at a fixed price,
have held that a right which may not be void under the rule against per-
petuities may nevertheless be obnoxious to the rule against restraints on
alienation.7 The committee of the American Bar Association, which has
been formed to aid in the reform of the rule against perpetuities, has
recommended that options of this type, known as options in gross, be
void to the extent that they may be exercised beyond twenty-one years.8
The present case decided in effect that all options not otherwise limited
in time will be valid during the lives of the parties and for twenty-one
years thereafter.
The social interest which requires some limitation to be placed upon
excessively long family settlements is not necessarily the same as that
which requires the application of some rule of reasonable duration to option
contracts involving the right to purchase an interest in land.9 The prob-
lem is not one of suspension of the power of alienation, because the parties
3. See note 1 supra.
4. Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 363, 92 Atl. 312, 316 (1914). The court rea-
soned as follows: "there is no present fixed right of future enjoyment in any of this
land in anybody, under the option .... The event upon which the estate is to arise.
to wit, the acceptance of the option to purchase is uncertain, being unconfined as to
limit of time. The interest created by this option, therefore, is not vested, but con-
tingent, and is within the rule against perpetuities."
5. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 528, 107 Atl. 138 (1929) ; Emerson
v. Campbell, 32 Del. Ch. 178, 84 A.2d 148 (1941) ; Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362,
32 N.E. 352 (1892); Starcher Bros. v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 397, 119 S.E. 89 (1907).
Cf. Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa. 143, 116 Ati. 392 (1922). See SIMES AND SMITH, THE
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1244 (2d ed. 1956); MORRIS AND LEACH, THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES 123-13 (1956).
6. See MORRIS AND LEACH, op. cit. supra at 218. The illustration is drawn from
English conveyancing practice. See In re Villar, 1 Ch. D. 243 (1929).
7. Cases where the right of preemption permits the holder to acquire the property
for a fixed sum as distinguished from the right to refuse the land at the owner's price
or at its then current value, are in effect indistinguishable from option contracts. It is
settled in England that such preemptive rights are invalid as unreasonable restraints on
alienation. In re Rosher, 26 Ch. D. 801 (1884) ; Hutt v. Hutt, 24 Ont. L.R. 574
(1911). The American cases are ew and divided. Maynard v. Polhemus, 74 Cal. 141,
15 Pac. 451 (1877); Kerschner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1955). Contra:
Roomhild v. Jones, 239 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1957) ; Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich.
531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926). See AMERICAN LAW OP PROPERTY § 26.66 (Casner ed.
1952) ; SIMES AND SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1154 (2d ed. 1956).
8. LEGISLATORS' HANDBOOK ON PERPETUITIES, prepared by the Committee on Rules
Against Perpetuities of the Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, Ameri-
can Bar Association (1958). See recommendation 14 at 9.
9. MORRIS AND LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 217-220 (1956).
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may at any time join to convey a good title.10 When an option is held by
a person not in possession of land as against an owner in possession, the
latter will tend to be discouraged from improving the land." The com-
munity, which in the end formulates and enforces the law, is interested
in the maximum development of this basic resource.12 That this is the
true reason for the rule is reflected in the refusal of courts to apply the
rule against perpetuities to an option appurtenant to a leasehold interest
by which the tenant is enabled to acquire the fee. 1 3 Having such an option,
a tenant will be encouraged to make improvements in keeping with the
demands of the time which he would hesitate to make for the sole benefit
of the reversioner.1 4 Those courts which apply the rule against restraints
on alienation to supplement the rule against perpetuities have seen that
the problem is not exclusively one of restraining alienation.'5 If the true
purpose of the rule is to remove impediments to the improvement of the
land, the period of twenty-one years suggested by the committee of the
American Bar Association is certainly too long unless it is intended to
be supplemented by the rule against restraints on alienation. In the in-
stant case, the option was actually exercised within a relatively short time,
although the land had no doubt greatly increased in value during the
period.1 6 The method employed by the court, if limited to the period be-
fore it, is consistent with the recommendation that the rule be applied
only to void the excess. 17 The option was held by a person who, as a
10. Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926).
11. This is the view expressed by MORRIS AND LEACH, op. cit. supra note 9.
Professor Simes characterizes the rule as designed to prevent the fettering of the
power of alienation. SIMES AND SMITH, THE LAW op FUTURE INTERESTS 159 (2d ed.
1956). This is also the view of the Restatement. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, §§ 370,
393-95 (1936).
12. An hostility to the land speculator who holds land in an unimproved condition
until it increases in value by reason of the development of the surrounding area, is
indigenous in Pennsylvania jurisprudence. This is reflected in the land laws enacted
immediately after the Revolution which made settlement and residence a condition to
the acquisition of private title in the public lands. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 64, § 141 (1792).
Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglas, 4 Dall. 392 (Pa. 1805).
13. Hollander v. Central Metal Supply Co., 109 Md. 131, 71 Atd. 442 (1909)
Winstanley v. Chapman, 325 Mass. 130, 89 N.E.2d 506 (1949); Poland Coal Co. v.
Hillman Coal & Coke Co., 357 Pa. 538, 55 A.2d 414 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 862
(1948) ; Detwiler v. Capone, 357 Pa. 495, 55 A.2d 380 (1947) ; Klugh's Estate, 63
York L.R. 5 (O.C. Pa. 1948). Contra: First Huntington National Bank v. Gideon-
Broh Realty Co., 139 W. Va. 130, 79 S.E.2d 675 (1953). The rule in West Virginia
appears to have been changed by statute, W. VA. CODE (Michie Cum. Supp. 1957)§ 3541(3), but only prospectively. See also SIMES AND SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS § 1244 (2d ed. 1956) ; MORRIS AND LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUI-
TIES 216 (1956).
14. MORRIS AND LEACH, op. cit. supra at 218.
15. "Does the instant contract unreasonably restrain alienation? That rule is
based upon (among other things) the desirability of 'keeping property responsive to
the current exigencies of its current beneficial owner' and upon the desirability of
avoiding the retardation of the natural development of a community by removing
property from the ordinary channels of trade and commerce." Kershner v. Hurlburt,
277 S.W.2d 619, 623-24 (Mo., 1955).
16. The option agreement was undated, but was acknowledged August 24, 1950,
and recorded. Notice was given that the plaintiff would be prepared to close at any
time after February 17, 1956.
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partner in the business conducted on the land, had a present possessory
interest therein, at least in equity,' and thus had an immediate interest
in the improvement of the land.' These factors may well justify the par-
ticular decision, but the sweep of the opinion indicates a need for a re-
examination of the Estates Act of 1947.
Leon A. Mankowski
INSURANCE-VARIABLE ANNUITIES-REGULATION BY THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION.
S.E.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. (D.C. Cir. 1958)
The defendant insurance company (VALIC) was authorized by the
District of Columbia to sell life insurance, including variable annuity poli-
cies. Because the premiums paid on a variable annuity policy are pre-
dominantly invested in common stock, and because the amount of pay-
ments to the annuitant on maturity of the policy are uncertain, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission sought to enjoin the sale of variable
annuity policies by the defendant until the policies were registered as
securities under the Securities Act of 1933,1 and until the defendant regis-
tered as an investment company under the Investment Company Act of
1940.2 The trial court found that the variable annuity contract was within
the purview of the 1933 Act and that the defendant (VALIC) was within
the scope of the 1940 Act, but held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act 3
barred federal regulation.4 The circuit court affirmed the judgment but
held that the defendant came within the exclusory clauses of the 1933 Act 5
and the 1940 Act,6 as well as being exempted from federal regulation by
18. The court did not investigate the state of the title at this stage of the pro-
ceedings.
19. The partner holding the option would have an interest in developing the land
as actually in possession, and would presumably be unable to secure the cooperation
of the other partner, without releasing the option, if onerous.
But an option to purchase land used in the business of a partnership was held void
as in violation of the rule against perpetuities in Emerson v. Campbell, 32 Del. Ch. 178,
84 A.2d 148 (1951).
1. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1952). "The term 'security' means
any . . . certificate of interest . . . in any profit sharing agreement, . . . investment
contract .... "
2. 54 STAT. 797 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)(3) (1952). "[I]nvestment company
means any issuer which . . . (3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of
investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities .... "
3. 59 STAT. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1952). "Congress declares that the con-
tinued regulation ... by the several states of the business of insurance is in the public
interest .... .
4. S.E.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp. 521 (1957).
5. 48 STAT. 76 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (8) (1952). "Any . . . annuity con-
tract ... subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner ... [of] the District
of Columbia [is excluded]."
6. 54 STAT. 798 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § a-3(c) (3) (1952). "... [N]one of the
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the McCarran Act. S.E.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 257 F.2d
201 (D.C. Cir. 1958).7
The variable annuity differs from the conventional annuity, which
pays a fixed amount out of funds invested in debt securities, in that its
premiums are invested in common stock and it pays fluctuating benefits.8
It is distinguished from a mutual fund in four significant ways: (1) the
annuitant is guaranteed a life income rather than facing the possibility
of outliving his investment in the mutual fund; (2) the policy cannot be
surrendered for its cash value after maturity whereas an interest in a
mutual fund is always saleable; (3) no direct benefits are received until
maturity of the policy, while a participant in a mutual fund gets dividends
soon after his investment; (4) an Internal Revenue ruling delays taxation
of the annuitant until his policy matures, whereas in .a mutual fund, the
security-holder pays his tax currently.9 The purpose of the variable annuity
is to cushion the effect of inflation on the purchasing power of the dollar;
the theory being that the common stock fund will increase in value as the
cost of living rises, permitting a higher number of annuity dollars to be
paid.10 The 1933 act which the S.E.C. sought to apply to the variable
annuity, guarantees to security purchasers a truthful disclosure of the
nature of the securities sold in interstate commerce.'1 Excluded from its
coverage, however, are insurance policies and annuity contracts because
the business world did not regard them as securities at the time of enact-
ment. 12 Also relied on was the 1940 act which protects inexperienced
investors by requiring investment companies to register with the S.E.C.,
and by giving the S.E.C. certain regulatory powers."' However, insurance
companies are also excluded from the coverage of this act because they
were already adequately supervised by state agencies in 1940.14 Lastly,
the defendant sought the protection of the McCarran Act which expresses
the congressional intent to leave regulation of insurance companies to the
states unless Congress expressly enacts legislation relating to the business
of insurance. 15
The variable annuity plan is a hybrid which has some features of
both a security and an annuity. 16 It would be almost impossible to place
7. S.E.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 257 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
8. Morrissey, Dispute Over the Variable Annuity, 35 HARV. Bus. Rev. 75 (1957).
9. Id. at 80, 81.
10. Schecter, Variable Annuities - Boon or Bane., 407 INs. L.J. 764-65 (1956).
The amount of annuity payments is based on the current value of the common stock
fund.
Though prices of common stocks have gone down during inflationary periods,
economic studies indicate that through the past seventy years, they have generally
followed this theory. Day, A Variable Annuity is not a "Security," 32 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 642-43 (1957).
11. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1952).
12. H.R. Rnp. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). But see Pyle, The Case
Against Variable Annuities, 407 INs. L.J. 776 (1956) for a more current view.
13. 54 STAT. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80(a) (1), (b) (21) (1952).
14. See Note, 41 Corum. L. REv. 259, 277 (1941).
15. 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1952).
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it exclusively in either category so as to determine who should regulate
it. 17 There is, moreover, little possibility of explicit regulatory legislation
in the near future unless by public demand.' 8 As a result it remains for
the Supreme Court to determine the type of regulation which will best
protect the public interest.' If the S.E.C. is found to be the proper regu-
latory agency, upon compliance with its regulations by the defendant, the
public would still be left to decide whether the variable annuity plan is
adequate.20 For example, the common stock fund could be composed of
highly speculative securities and as long as the defendant fully disclosed
this, the S.E.C. would not bar the sale of the policy. Conversely, the
District of Columbia regulatory body investigates the variable annuity
policies before they are sold and determines whether they are safe for
the public.21 In the above illustration, should the insurance superintendant
believe that the common stock fund is too speculative, he could prevent
the policy from issuing. It would seem that the latter system, if enforced,
is a more effective safeguard than S.E.C. regulation for the individual
who purchases a variable annuity policy because he lacks knowledge of
the relative stability in different common stock issues.22
Joseph P. Kelly
INTERNATIONAL LAW-TRUSTEESHIP AS FOREIGN COUNTRY-
STATUS OF KWAJALEIN UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT.
Callas v. United States (2d Cir. 1958)
This was a tort action, brought in the district court of Brooklyn,
under the Federal Tort Claims Act,' for injuries to a child of an officer
in the United States Navy, stationed on the island of Kwajalein. Kwajalein
17. See 56 MICH. L.R. 656, 658. But see, Comment, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 76, 82
(1958).
18. It is common knowledge that the 1933 act and the 1940 act were passed because
of numerous frauds perpetrated on the investing public. There is no indication to date
that defendant (VALIC) has engaged in such activity.
19. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1958, p. 54,
Col. 8.
20. Every security prospectus issued after S.E.C. registration states: "These
securities have not been approved or disapproved by the Securities and Exchange
Commission nor has the Commission passed on the accuracy or adequacy of the pros-
pectus." See 48 STAT. 87 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 8 7z (1952).
21. The salient regulatory powers of section 35 of the District of Columbia Code
are: (a) each annuity contract must be approved by the insurance superintendent;
(b) to do business VALIC is required to deposit one hundred thousand dollars in
securities (it has deposited two hundred thousand) ; (c) the insurance superintendent
may refuse to renew the annual certificate of authority to do business if public interest
is adversely affected, and he may revoke the certificate for enumerated improprieties;
and (d) VALIC must submit an extensive annual report to the insurance super-
intendent.
22. Of course, it would be possible for both the S.E.C. and the insurance super-
intendent to regulate the variable annuity. However, as has been set forth here, there
appears to be no urgent need for S.E.C. regulation.
1. 60 STAT. 843, 28 U.S.C. 2671-80 (1946).
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is an island in the Marshall group, 2 which is part of the trusteeship ad-
ministered by the United States under a trust agreement with the United
Nations.3 The district court found that plaintiff's claim was within the
section of the Federal Tort Claims Act excluding claims which occur in
a foreign country,4 and the action was therefore barred under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed, holding that
the United States was not sovereign over the trust territory, and therefore
Kwajalein was a foreign country within the meaning of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, and no action could be maintained under the act against
the United States for injuries sustained on that island. Callas v. United
States, 253 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1958).'
The notion of sovereignty is inextricably woven into the concept of
what is a foreign nation, early decisions having defined a foreign country
as one without the sovereignty of the United States." Nations holding
trusteeships generally do not consider themselves sovereign over such
territories. 7 The administering nation, nevertheless, is given certain in-
cidents of sovereignty over the trust territory, which include, inter alia,
the management of internal affairs, the provision for external defense, and
the right to demand allegiance from the inhabitants.8 However, the ad-
ministering nation may not cede or annex the territory; nor administer it
except within the framework of the trust agreement." Conversely, the
United States generally considers itself to be sovereign over its territories,
and therefore claims against the federal government have been succssfully
litigated in the territories under the Federal Tort Claims Act.10 However,
a base leased from Great Britain in Newfoundland, though a possession of
the United States for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act," was held
to be a foreign country for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act.12 The
Court in the latter instance determined that the legislative purpose in exclud-
ing claims in foreign countries was to avoid subjecting the United States to
claims that would be adjudicated under law not common to the United
States and its territories.' 3 Okinawa, occupied by the United States since
2. For the territorial extent of the United States trusteeship, see U.S. DEP'T oF
STATE PUB., UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION SERIES 18, The United States and Non-
Self Governing Territories (1947).
3. Trusteeship Agreement for Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18, 1947,
61 STAT. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665.
4. Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 STAT. 843, 28 U.S.C. 2680(k) (1946).
5. Callas v. United States, 253 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1958).
6. The Adventure, I Fed. Cas. 202, No. 93 (C.C. Va. 1812); The Eliza, 8 Fed.
Cas. 455, No. 4, 346 (C.C. Mass. 1813).
7. U.N. Doc. No. A/C. 4/SuB.1/30 (1946); U.S. DEP'T STATE PUB. No. 2784(1946) ; Report of the Fourth Committee on Trusteeship Agreements, U.N. Doc.
No. A/258 (1946).
8. OPPENIIZIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 203-18 (7th ed. 1948) ; HILL, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION 529-38 (1952).
9. Ibid.
10. See Brandt v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 627 (D.C. Guam 1953) ; Wilseam v.
United States, 76 F. Supp. 581 (D.C. Hawaii, 1948).
11. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
12. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
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World War II, has also been held foreign for purposes of the Federal
Tort Claims Act; the Court reasoned that since its final disposition had
been left in suspension by the treaty of peace with Japan, the United States
was not sovereign, even though it had full administrative control over the
island.1 4 In addition, Saipan, an island in the trust area, had been declared
without the sovereignty of the United States for purposes of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, prior to the assumption of the trust by the United States,
on the ground that occupation and possession were not alone sufficient to
incorporate the island into United States territory.' " There was dictum
in the case to the effect that Saipan would still be foreign after it became
a trusteeship, since the United States would hold only for an indefinite
period on behalf of the United Nations.' 6
Under principles of international law, Kwajalein would appear to
be without the sovereignty of the United States. The control exercised
by the United States, although substantial, lacks many indicia of sov-
ereignty, for example, ability to annex or cede. But the dissenting opinion
points out "that 'foreign country' as used in the Federal Tort Claims Act
is not a term of art, and that'its construction is dependent on the intent
of Congress in excluding claims arising in foreign countries from the re-
medial provisions of the Act." 17 The court in the instant case, although
agreeing that the legislative intent of Congress in excluding foreign coun-
tries was to prevent the United States from being subjected to claims which
would be based on law not common to it and its territories, is in conflict
as to the actual state of the internal law of Kwajalein. While the majority
of the court found that the internal law of Kwajalein is the primitive local
law, which contains relatively few negligence concepts, the dissenting opinion
indicates that the internal law to be applied should be that law basic to
the United States and its territories. 18 The latter view would seem to
be supported by the United States Department of the Interior.19 However
inadequate the latter concepts might seem, they would appear preferable
to a juridical vacuum where there exists no remedy for negligence because
of the underdevelopment of tort law. Further, by the terms of the trust
agreement, the United States not only has the power to apply to the trust
territory such laws of the United States as it deems appropriate,20 but
has the obligation to provide a system of law for the territory which will
14. Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 343 U.S. 917
(1951).
15. Brunell v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
16. Id. at 71.
17. Callas v. United States, 253 F.2d 838, 842 (2d Cir. 1958).
18. Id. at 844.
19. The Director of the Office of Territories of the Department of the Interior
has stated that the law of the trust territory includes the common law of England and
all the statutes of Parliament in force on July 3, 1776. Callas v. United States, 253
F.2d 838, 843 (2d Cir. 1958).
20. See Trusteeship Agreement for Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18,
1947, art. III, 61 STAT. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665.
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protect the rights and fundamental freedoms of all elements of the popu-
lation without discrimination. 21 The application of legal concepts funda-
mental to the United States territories, and as a result, the application
of the Federal Tort Claims Act, would seem to be a step towards satis-
fying this obligation.
Peter G. Nyhart
JURISDICTION-IN PERSONAM JUDGMENT AGAINST NONRESIDENT-
CONTRACTUAL APPOINTMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE
To RECEIVE PROCESS.
Green Mountain College v. Levine (Vt. 1958)
The defendants made a promissory note in the state of Vermont pay-
able to the plaintiff. In the note the defendants, as nonresidents of the
state, appointed the Secretary of State of Vermont to accept service in
their behalf in connection with any litigation which might arise pertinent
to the note. Service of process was effected by the sheriff delivering the
writ to the Secretary of State of Vermont and the Secretary sending a
copy to the defendants' home in Brooklyn, New York. The attorney for
the defendants made a special appearance to contest the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the defendants and filed a motion to dismiss
the action. The 'trial court overruled the motion to dismiss on the ground
that the motion had been signed by the defendants' attorney and not per-
sonally endorsed by the defendants as required. On appeal of the denial
of the motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court of Vermont, two justices
dissenting, affirmed the lower court's ruling and held that by appointing
the Secretary of State as an agent to receive process the defendants had
waived their right to personal service and the lack of capacity of the Secre-
tary to act as process agent and the danger that notice might not be for-
warded to the defendants were risks that the defendants undertook in ap-
pointing the Secretary of State to receive service for them. Green Mountain
College v. Levine, 139 A.2d 822 (Vt. 1958). 1
A personal judgment against a nonresident who is not personally
served within the state and who does not waive the necessity of service
by a general appearance is usually unenforceable. 2 However, a nonresident
may voluntarily appoint a resident as his agent to receive service for him
in a particular transaction, 3 or this agency may arise by implication of
21. See Trusteeship Agreement for Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18,
1947, art. VI, 61 STAT. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665.
1. Green Mountain College v. Levine, 139 A.2d 822 (Vt. 1958).
2. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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law.4 The most typical of the latter are the nonresident automobile statutes
which provide that the nonresident in using the state highway appoints
the secretary of state or other public official as his agent to receive process
for him in any litigation that arises from his use of the highways of that
state.5 These statutes have been upheld as a valid exercise of the police
power of the state in protecting the welfare of its citizens by regulating
the use of a dangerous instrumentality.0 The police power of the state
was also the ground for upholding an Iowa statute7 which permitted sub-
stituted service on a seller of securities, since the selling of stocks and
bonds was subject to state regulation.s Many states have similar statutes
requiring a nonresident corporation to appoint a public official to receive
process within that state as a reasonable condition upon the exercise of a
nonresident's right to do business within that state's boundaries.9 The
maker of a promissory note, moreover, may appoint any attorney of any
court of the state wherein the note was made to appear and confess judg-
ment against him for the amount of the note, thus consenting to a waiver
of personal service.' 0 When parties to a contract agree to abide by the
decision of a foreign court or arbitration board, they have given the foreign
state personal jurisdiction over themselves and have waived their right
to be personally served in that jurisdiction." A recent federal case1 2 held
4. Davidson v. Doherty & Co., 214 Iowa 739, 241 N.W. 700 (1932) (service on
agent in charge of agency of defendant gave court jurisdiction, even though defendant
was nonresident).
5. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) ; Scorza v. Deatherage, 208 F.2d
660 (8th Cir. 1954) ; Kokenge v. Holthaus, 243 Iowa 571, 52 N.W.2d 711 (1952).
It must be reasonably probable that the nonresident will receive notice of the
pending litigation in order that the statute be constitutional. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276
U.S. 13 (1928) ; Hendershot v. Ferkel, 144 Ohio St. 112, 56 N.E.2d 205 (1944).
6. Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953) ; Nelson v. Miller, 11
Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
7. IOWA CODE § 11079 (1931).
8. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) ; see 48 HARV. L. Riv. 1433
(1935).
9. See Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court,
289 U.S. 361 (1933) ; American Railway Express Co. v. Fleishman, Morris & Co.,
149 Va. 200, 141 S.E. 253 (1928), cert. denied 278 U.S, 652 (1929). But cf. Daoud v.
Klevin Investment Co., 30 N.J. Super. 38, 103 A.2d 257 (1954).
10. Gotham Credit Corp. v. Powell, 22 N.J. Misc. 301, 38 A. 2d 700 (1944)
Hazel v. Jacobs, 78 N.J.L. 459, 75 Atl. 903 (1910). See also Bowles v. Schmitt & Co.,
170 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1948).
Even when a state will not recognize such a confession of judgment in its ownjurisdiction, it will enforce the judgment of another jurisdiction if such a confession
was valid under the law of the other state. Turner v. Alton Banking & Trust Co.,
181 F.2d 899 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 340 U.S. 833 (1950) ; Carroll v. Gore, 106 Fla.
582, 143 So. 633 (1932) ; Whittier v. Riley, 104 Neb. 805, 178 N.W. 762 (1920);
Morris v. Douglass, 237 App. Div. 747, 262 N.Y. Supp. 712 (1st Dept. 1933) ; accord
Cohn, Baer & Berman v. Bromberg, 185 Iowa 298, 170 N.W. 478 (1919).
Because such warrants of attorney constitute a waiver of process, they are strictly
construed. Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890);
Webster Grocer Co. v. Gammel, 285 Ill. App. 277, 1 N.E.2d 890 (1936) ; Gordon v.
Heller, 371 Mich. 240, 260 N.W. 156, cert. denied 296 U.S. 619 (1935).
11. Frey & Horgan Corp. v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 2d 401, 55 P.2d 203, cert.
denied 298 U.S. 694 (1936) ; Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931)
Mitsubishi Goshi Kaisha v. Carstens Packing Co., 116 Wash. 630, 200 Pac. 327 (1921)
see 30 MicH. L. REv. 159 (1931).
12. Diamond v. Beutel, 247 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1957).
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that the one appointed as agent to receive notice of a claim need not be
aware of his appointment of agency until he is notified of the claim, it
being sufficient that a third party claimant has reasonably relied on the
principal's direction to give notice to his agent. 13
The jurisdiction of a state over nonresidents who make contracts or
commit torts within its boundaries has been considerably extended 14 since
the decision of Pennoyer v. Neff. 15 The changes have been statutory and
found not to be violative of due process16 if the defendant has notice of
the suit pending against him. A Vermont statute allows substituted serv-
ice on a foreign corporation doing business in Vermont by service upon
the secretary of state.17  It appears that the plaintiff and defendants, as
individuals, were attempting to establish by contract a method of service
which would have been the normal procedure had the defendants been a
corporation.18 The majority of the court based its decision on the con-
tractual arrangement, but the dissenting justices thought that the service
was invalid since the Secretary of State had no authority by statute to
accept service in this situation and the element of consent was lacking for
a true agency relationship. 19 It is questionable that this relationship should
be determinative in the instant case. The agency in the nonresident auto-
mobile statutes and similar statutes is a fictitious one and not based on the
actual consent of the nonresident to such a mode of service.20 Although
the Secretary of State of Vermont was not authorized by statute to accept
service in the situation presented, neither was he prohibited by statute
from doing so. It is submitted that the defendants are not imposing a
duty on a public official as suggested by the dissenting justices21 but rather
are assuming the risk that notice of process may or may not reach them
through service upon the Secretary of State. An agreement such as the
one in the instant case has the advantage that a nonresident is more likely
to carry out the terms of his contract knowing an action can be brought
13. In a boat-owner's petition for limitation of liability the court held that the
injured party's filing of a claim with the boat-owner's insurance company was
written notice of claim to the boat-owner under 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1936). Bass v.
American Products Export & Import Corp., 124 S.C. 346, 117 S.E. 594 (1923).
14. E.g., State ex rel. Weber v. Register, 67 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1953).
15. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
16. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
17. VT. STAT. 1947 § 1562. "If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a
resident of Vermont to be performed in whole or in part by either party in Vermont,
or if such foreign corporation commits a tort in whole or in part in Vermont against a
resident of Vermont, such acts shall be deemed to be doing business in Vermont by
such foreign corporation and shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment by such
foreign corporation of the secretary of the state of Vermont and his successors to be
its true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process in any
actions or proceedings against such foreign corporation arising from or growing out
of such contract or tort."
18. Cf. Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
19. Green Mountain College v. Levine, 139 A.2d 822, 826 (Vt. 1958) (dissenting
opinion).
20. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
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against him by substituted service on a public official. However, a diffi-
culty would arise if such contracts became commonplace. The secretary
of state or an other public official designated as agent to receive service
might become burdened with writs of service. In such an event, the
problem might be handled by a statute to the effect that substituted service
upon a public official of the state in his official capacity is valid only
when authorized by statute.
John J. Guilfoyle, Jr.
LABOR LAW-FAILIURE TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY-BALLOT
CLAUSE NOT A MANDATORY BARGAINING SUBJECT.
N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp. (U.S. 1958)
Plaintiff, a certified International Union, presented defendant cor-
poration with a collective bargaining agreement. Defendant offered the
counterproposal that as to all non-arbitrable issues,' there should be a
thirty day negotiation period after which, before any strike could be called
by the union, there would have to be a secret ballot taken among the em-
ployees, union and non-union, on the defendant's last offer. Should a ma-
jority of the employees reject this last offer, the company would have the
opportunity to make a new proposal within seventy-two hours and have
a vote taken on that proposal prior to the calling of any strike by the
union. Despite the union's refusal to accept this ballot clause, the com-
pany insisted to the point of impasse that it be included in the agreement.
The union then filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board
that the company, by refusing to bargain collectively, was guilty of an
unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a) (5) of the Taft-Hartley
Act.2 The Board found that the employer's insistence upon inclusion of
the ballot clause in the agreement as a condition precedent to acceptance
amounted to a refusal to bargain collectively. Upon appeal, the circuit
court reversed, holding that the ballot proposal came within the mandatory
bargaining subjects of section 8(d) and the company therefore could
insist upon its inclusion in any bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court,
however, reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the
1. Non-arbitrable issues included modification, amendment, or termination of the
contract.
2. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1952). This section provides
that it is an unfair labor practice for the employer to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees subject to the provisions of section 9(a).
That section provides that representatives, designated for the purposes of collective
bargaining by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment.
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ballot clause did not come within Section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act,3
and the employer's insistence upon it to the point of creating an impasse
in the negotiations was a refusal to bargain collectively concerning manda-
tory subjects. The court further found that the good faith motives of the
employer were irrelevant in the face of his insistence upon the inclusion
of subjects not within section 8(d). N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Div. of Borg-
Warner Corp., 78 Sup. Ct. 718 (1958). 4
The purpose of the National Labor Relations Act' is not to compel
agreements between employers and employees' representatives, but to com-
pel the parties to at least negotiate concerning certain mandatory subjects in
an effort to secure industrial peace.6 -This purpose has been carried over
into the Taft-Hartley Act.7 Moreover, it has been found that insistence
that matters outside section 8(d) be included in an agreement as a con-
dition precedent to acceptance, is a refusal to bargain concerning the other
mandatory bargaining subjects.8 In the above instances, the courts have
reasoned that such action by employers evidence a refusal to bargain, per
se, and at least one court has condemned such as bargaining in bad faith.9
That the strike ballot clause or other similar ballot clauses are within
section 8(d) has been the subject of conflict among the courts.' 0 In
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., n strike ballot and ratification clauses
were found by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to be within
3. 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952), which defines collective
bargaining as follows: "for the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."
4. N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 78 Sup. Ct. 718 (1958).
5. 49 STAT. 142 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(5) (1940).
6. See N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); N.L.R.B. v.
Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 623 (4th Cir. 1940) ; Art Metals Const. Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 110 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1940).
7. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952). "It is the purpose and policy
of this Act, . . .to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the inter-
ference by either with the legitimate rights of the other . . . ." Cf. United States v.
Brennan, 134 F. Supp. 42 (8th Cir. 1955); Lewittes & Sons v. United Furniture
Workers of America, 95 F. Supp. 851 (1951).
8. N.L.R.B. v. Pecheur Lozenge Co., 209 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1953) (that union
abandon a strike) ; N.L.R.B. v. Dalton Tel. Co., 187 F.2d 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 824 (1951) (that union become amenable in state courts) ; American
Laundry Machinery Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 981 (1948), enforcement granted 174 F.2d
124 (6th Cir. 1949) that union withdraw certain charges it had filed with the board) ;
N.L.R.B. v. George Pilling & Son Co., 119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1941) (that union organize
the industry in general); Aldora Mills, Inc., 79 N.L.R.B. 1 (1948) (that certified
union charter local union) ; Hartzell Mills Co. v. N.L.R.B., 11 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1940)
(that union withdraw charges as to the discriminatory discharge of an employee).
9. N.L.R.B. v. George Pilling & Son, Co., 119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1941).
10. N.L.R.B. v. Darlington Veneer Co., 236 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1956). Contra
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 213 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1954).
11. 213 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1954). The strike vote clause in the company's counter-
proposal provided that should no new agreement be reached after a written notice
of termination had been tendered, the present one year agreement would be extended
thirty days for negotiation purposes, and the union could not call a strike at the end
of this period without approval by a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit.
The ratification clause made any agreement reached subject to a secret ballot or
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the scope of section 8(d) and the employer could therefore insist upon
their inclusion in the bargaining contract even to the point of creating an
impasse in the negotiations; the court rejected the plea of the union that
the acceptance of the employer's proposal would permit interference into
the internal affairs of the union. In N.L.R.B. v. Darlington Veneer Co.,1 2
however, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
employer by insisting that the contract become effective only upon ratifica-
tion by a secret vote of the employees, was attempting to bargain, not
with respect to the subjects within section 8 (d), but with respect to the
authority of the duly certified representatives, a matter specifically fixed
by the Taft-Hartley Act.'2 The court in that case found bad faith on the
part of the employer because the subject of bargaining was not mandatory
and therefore could not be insisted upon to the point of creating an impasse
in the negotiations.
It can be seen from the instant case that if it be found that the subject
upon whose inclusion the employer is insisting is not within section 8(d),
and that the employer's insistence on its inclusion creates an impasse in
the negotiations, then the employer is necessarily bargaining in bad faith,
and no further determination as to his good faith motives is material.
Further, there is authority to the effect that the employer, by ignoring
the employees' representatives, and negotiating with the employees directly,
violates the duty imposed by the Taft-Hartley Act to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees.1 4 It would seem that the in-
clusion of the ballot clause in the instant case would accomplish this
same result. Though, to be sure, the clause provides for initial negotiation
between the union and the employer; the opportunity afforded the em-
ployer of by-passing the union and dealing directly with the employees
is so substantial as to render the initial negotiations no more than a pretence
for satisfying the collective bargaining requirements of the act. In addi-
tion, by enabling the employer to submit a new proposal to the employees
within seventy-two hours after the rejection of the old, the union would
be deprived of its most effective bargaining weapon, the right to an im-
mediate strike. Clearly, the Taft-Hartley Act was never intended to en-
courage the circumvention of the union in labor negotiations, when one
of the express purposes of the act is to place employers in a more nearly
equal position with unions in collective bargaining. 5
Edward O'Malley
12. 236 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1956).
13. 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952).
14. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 213 U.S. 678 (1944); N.L.R.B. v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) ; Virginian Railway v. System Federa-
tion, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
15. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
FALL 1958]
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1958], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol4/iss1/5
158 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4.
TORTS-SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS NOT
IMMUNE TO COUNTERCLAIMS WHEN ACTION Is BROUGHT
UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT.
Newark v. United States (3d Cir. 1958)
An ambulance owned by the city of Newark collided with a United
States mail truck while both vehicles were being operated on official busi-
ness within that city. Newark brought an action against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act1 for the damage to the ambulance,
and the United States filed a counterclaim for the damage to the mail
truck. The district court found both drivers guilty of negligence and
denied the counterclaim of the United States. The court held that the
New Jersey case law under which sovereign immunity prevents a private
defendant from raising the defense of contributory negligence in a suit
by a municipality2 was applicable to the federal government under the
terms of the Federal Tort Claims Act; and therefore, the contributory
negligence of the ambulance driver did not bar Newark's suit. Neverthe-
less, the trial court dismissed Newark's suit, finding that the ambulance
driver's negligence amounted to active wrongdoing and thus was im-
putable to the city under New Jersey law.3 On appeal the circuit court
affirmed the decision of the district court but did so, however, on the
ground that the United States could use the defense of contributory
negligence in a suit against it by a New Jersey municipality. 4 Newark v.
United States, 254 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1958).'
It is well settled that the United States can sue a state without its
consent.6 The consent of the states to suits against them by the federal
government is inherent in the constitutional plan, whereby the supreme
sovereignty is vested in the federal government.7  Since the sovereign
immunity of a municipal corporation is derived from that of the state, a
1. 60 STAT. 843 (1946), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1436(b), (c) 2674 (Supp. 1952).
2. Miller v. Layton, 133 N.J.L. 323, 44 A.2d 177 (1945) ; Paterson v. Erie R. Co.,
78 N.J.L. 592, 75 Atl. 922 (1910). New Jersey is practically the only jurisdiction in
which this rule is applied.
3. In order to avoid the harshness of the rule that contributory negligence cannot
be imputed to a plaintiff city, New Jersey courts permit contributory negligence to be
imputed to a municipality, if such negligence amounts to active wrongdoing, and not
merely a careless ommission. Hartman v. City of Brigatine, 42 N.J. Super. 247, 126
A.2d 224 (1956), affirmed, 23 N.J. 530, 129 A.2d 876 (1957). See also Cloyes v.
Township of Delaware, 23 N.J. 324, 129 A.2d 1 (1957) ; Casile v. Housing Authority
of Newark, 42 N.J. Super. 52, 125 A.2d 895 (1956).
4. It is interesting to note that the court went out of its way to determine this
point. Since on the facts of the case, New Jersey law permitted the negligence of
the driver to be imputed to the city, there was no need to decide the general avail-
ability of the defense of contributory negligence.
5. Newark v. United States, 254 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1958).
6. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950) ; United States v. Texas, 339
U.S. 707 (1950) ; United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947) ; United States v.
Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892); California v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 723 (N.D.
Cal. 1950).
7. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
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municipality can have no greater immunity than a state. s Although the
federal government is similarly immune from suits by a state or private
person, under the terms of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States
waives its sovereign immunity in ceriain specific cases and consents to be
sued as a private individual in like circumstances. 9 The question here is
whether the United States will be treated as a private person in determin-
ing its right to file a counterclaim or other defense against a sovereign
body bringing suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. When California sued the United States under this act, state im-
munity was held to be no bar to a cross-complaint by the United States.10
However, the court based its decision on the right of the federal govern-
ment to sue a state and did not consider whether the United States should
be treated as a private individual under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Sovereign immunity, however, prevented the United States from filing a
third party complaint against Arizona, in a suit brought by a private in-
dividual against the United States, the circuit court holding that in such
a situation the United States should be treated as a private person."
The main case illustrates the necessity of interpreting an act of Con-
gress according to the intention of the lawmakers and not the letter of
the statute. The primary purpose of the Federal Tort Claims Act is to
provide a just and adequate remedy to those injured through the fault of
any government employee acting within the scope of his employment and
to free Congress from the burden of introducing private bills granting per-
mission to sue the United States.12 Some courts feel that any waiver of
sovereign immunity should be strictly construed.' 3 Others insist that sov-
ereign immunity is an archaic principle and any statute waiving such im-
munity should be liberally interpreted because of its beneficent purpose.' 4
Perhaps the wisest course is not to worry about any rule of strict or liberal
construction but to construe the act so as to make it internally consistent
and equitable.' 5 In the instant case, the court understood the obvious
unfairness of permitting Newark to take advantage of the federal gov-
ernment's waiver of immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act, while
at the same time using its own immunity as a shield against a valid de-
fense of the United States; the court recognized the defense of contributory
negligence even though a literal interpretation of the act would bar such
in New Jersey. This decision was probably more in keeping with the
8. Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911).
9. 60 STAT. 843 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (Supp. 1952).
10. California v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Cal. 1950).
11. United States v. Arizona, 214 F.2d 389 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied, 216
F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1954).
12. Capital Transit Co. v. United States, 183 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
13. E.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941).
14. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940); Jones v. United States, 126 F.
Supp. 10 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
15. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) ; Panella v. United States,
216 F.2d 622 (1954).
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spirit of the Federal Tort Claims Act, for Congress could hardly have
foreseen such an unusual situation as this and clearly never intended this
act to increase the sovereign immunity of municipal corporations.
Patrick M. Ryan
TRADE REGULATION S-RETRAINT OF TRADE-SHERMAN ACT: PER
SEE ILLEGALITY OF TYING AGREEMENTS.
Northern PacificRy. v. United States (U.S. 1958)
Defendant is owner in fee simple of extensive landholdings, most of
which is currently under lease.' Many of the lease agreements contain
preferential routing clauses, requiring the lessees to ship via the Northern
Pacific providing that its rates and services are equal to those of compet-
ing lines.2 The United States filed suit in a federal district court for an
injunction restraining the enforcement of the agreements on the grounds
that such tying agreements8 were unlawful restraints of trade under Section
one of the Sherman Act.4 On the government's motion, the district court
entered summary judgment and the defendant appealed to the Supreme
Court. Adopting the district court's reasoning the Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the defendant's exertion of substantial economic power, by
virtue of its extensive landholdings, as a lever to induce large numbers of
lessees and grantees to enter such agreements was a per se unreasonable
restraint of trade and as such violated Section one of the Sherman Act.
Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 78 Sup. Ct. 514 (1958).8
In Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., a 1912 patent infringement case, the
Sherman Act was held not to be applicable to tying contracts. 6 In 1914,
however, Congress enacted the Clayton Act 7 which was relied upon in
overruling the A. B. Dick case.6 It has been held under the Clayton Act that
the illegality of a tying agreement can be found from either a showing of
dominance by the seller in the market of the tying product or a restraint
1. The Northern Pacific was the recipient of a Congressional land grant of some
40 million acres of land which consisted of every alternate section of land in a belt
twenty to forty miles wide on either side of the tracks through the several states and
territories from Lake Superior to the Puget Sound. They still retain fee simple
ownership of 2,700,000 acres most of which is currently under lease, and mineral rights
in another six million acres.
2. Many of the agreements of sale covering the acreage already disposed of con-
tained similar clauses and they too are the subject of the present action.
3. The tying product in the present case is the land and the tied product is the
freight, i.e., shipment of all products produced on or taken from the land in question.
4. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
5. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 78 Sup. Ct. 514 (1958).
6. 224 U.S. 1, 28-35 (1912).
7. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952).
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of an appreciable volume of business by him in the market of the tied pro-
duct.9 The criteria of illegality under the Sherman Act are not as simple
as it requires a conjunctive test of the above two elements.' 0 It is not
every restraint of trade that is illegal under the Sherman Act but only
that which is unreasonable.". In general those restraints which have been
held to be unreasonable are those which are so substantial as to affect
market prices,' 2 and those which foreclose competition from a particular
market.'a The Sherman Act, however, does not demand that there be
competition, but only that competition not be foreclosed from a market
by unreasonable restraints of trade such as tying agreements.' 4 The essence
of illegality in tying agreements is the wielding of a dominant economic
position in one market as a lever to obtain an advantage in the market
of a second product.15 Prior to 1947, tying agreements were found to be
illegal under the simple test of the Clayton Act because of their pernicious
effect on commerce in the market of the tied product.' 6 However, in 1947
in International Salt Co. v. United States,1 7 a case involving a vendor who
owned patents on the tying product and who had a substantial effect
on commerce in the market of the tied product, that a tying agreement
was held to be a per se unreasonable restraint of trade under the con-
junctive test of the Sherman Act. A per se violation of the Sherman Act
was also found in the absence of patents on the tying product where the
undisputed facts of comparable market data established the defendant's
dominance in the market in such goods.' 8 In Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States9 the court refused to find a per se violation in the
absence of either vendor's ownership of patents on the tying product or
comparable market data that would establish his dominance in the market
of the tying product.
The present suit was brought only under section one of the Sherman
Act with both parties relying on the Times-Picayune and International
9. See, e.g., International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131,
135-36 (1936) (restraint of commerce in the tied product) ; United Shoe Mach. Corp.
v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 455-58 (1922) (market domination in the tying
product).
10. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1947) ; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392 (1947).
11. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910).
12. H. B. Marienelli, Ltd. v. United Booking Offices, 227 Fed. 165 (S.D.N.Y.
1914).
13. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Standard Oil Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923); United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1910).
14. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920).
15. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
16. United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
17. 332 U.S. 392 (1947). Defendant's ownership of patents on the machines and
his effect on commerce in the market for industrial salt were established by the plead-
ings and admissions.
18. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1947). Here the undisputed facts
were that defendant was the owner of the sole movie house in many towns and the sole
outlet for films in some areas comprising several towns.
19. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
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Salt cases. Justice Black, writing for the Court in the instant case, 20 found
that the requirement of market dominance in the tying product spoken
of in the Times-Picayune case was only general language and that the
Times-Picayune case did not limit the holding of International Salt to
cases where there are patents or copyrights on the tying product. How-
ever, in the absence of a patent or copyright on the tying product there
must be comparable market data in the record which establishes defen-
dant's dominance in the market of the tying product.2 ' In the present case
the lower court ignored the dominance test and made the validity of the
tying agreements depend entirely on the commercial restraints accom-
plished by them. Sole proof of market dominance in the tying product
in the instant case was defendant's fee simple ownership of the land, and
his ability to obtain the leases with preferential routing clauses. The record
is void of facts regarding the landholdings of the defendant in relation
to others in the same market and there is no market defined. 22 Nor was
there any discussion of the uniqueness of land which of itself might define
the market and prove the necessary dominance or control. The same
criticism is true of the Court's handling of the second element, i.e., restraint
of an appreciable volume of business in the market of the tied product, the
lower court merely stating that the amount of freight shipped from such
landholdings is substantial. 23 There was no mention of the amount of
shipping presently being handled by competition. The present finding of
a per se violation based solely on section one of the Sherman Act in the
absence of a patent on the tying product or comparable market data from
which the dominance of defendant in the market of the tying product can
be inferred, changes the criteria for violations of section one of the Sherman
Act to the disjunctive test of the Clayton Act and leaves the outcome of
future litigation on the subject questionable.
Edward T. Bresnan
20. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 78 Sup. Ct. 514, 521 (1958).
21. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953) ; United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1947) ; accord, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293, 307 (1949).
22. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 78 Sup. Ct. 514, 525 (1958) (dissenting
opinion).
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